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ABSTRACT
This paper offers a theoretical discussion of a number of criteria that may be used in 
distinguishing the role of advertising in an oligopolistic market framework. Empirical evidence 
is obtained by testing single and simultaneous equation models using Australian data related to 
the banking industry.
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INTRODUCTION
It may be possible, at least theoretically, to distinguish between three types of 
advertising, according to the objective and outcome of the campaign: informative, offensive and 
defensive advertising. Informative advertising is a form of consumer education which is 
necessary if consumers are to make intelligent choices, in fact it makes competition nearly 
perfect since one of the basic assumptions of perfect competition is perfect knowledge. Since 
in real life imperfect knowledge is the rule rather than the exception, advertising plays a major 
role in our economy. The main tasks of a seller are to inform potential buyers of his existence, 
his line of goods and his prices. Since both buyers and sellers change over time (due to birth, 
death, change in age and migration), since people forget information once acquired, and since 
new products (and new uses of existing products) appear, the existence of sellers must be 
continuously publicised [2].
Many oligopolistic markets are characterised by non-price competition. In such 
markets, advertising is the main competitive mechanism. The producer who is deciding 
whether to advertise is therefore making a decision of fundamentally the same kind as that 
which he makes when he decides what price to charge for his product or how large an output to 
produce. It is not really very important to him whether his firm maximises its profit by 
changing the price - output of its products, by altering the physical constitution of its products; 
or by spending money on advertising. The primary objective of competitive advertising is for 
the firm to make its potential customers look upon its product as rather different from the other 
product. The idea is to use advertising in lowering the elasticity of demand for the brand in 
question. When this happens, the consumers will regard this brand as being more desirable, 
even if its price is rather higher than the prices of close substitutes. This would increase sales 
and, possibly expand the brand’s market share.
Advertising is often used as a defensive mechanism to protect existing market shares. 
This often happens when new firms find it easy to enter the market. It has been noted that 
when any firm embarks on an intensified advertising campaign, other firms step up their 
promotional expenses to avoid a possible loss of market position. On the other hand, if any 
firm decides to economise on its advertising budget without a compensating increase in some
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other aspects of its total selling effort, its exposure is reduced and its share of the market may 
decline if its competitors do not follow a similar policy. Competitive pressures may lead 
individual firms to increase their advertising expenditure and the same pressure would also 
preclude their decreasing it.
The aim of this study is to examine the role of advertising in oligopolistic markets. 
The paper is divided into four sections. Section one offers a theoretical discussion of the 
criteria that may be used to assess the role of advertising and the models which will be tested to 
provide empirical evidence. Section two outlines the basic characteristics of the data used in the 
analysis and reports the regression results of single equation models. Section three tests a 
simultaneous equation model to examine the interdependence between market shares and 
advertising within an oligopolistic market structure. Finally section four summarises the main 
findings of the paper. Although the empirical evidence is related to the Australian banking 
industry, the methodology and conclusions should be relevant to most oligopolistic markets 
characterised by non-price competition.
SECTION 1 
THEORY AND MODELS:
Let us assume that there are two competing firms: A and B, where,
Va = Firm A ’s advertising 
Vb = Firm B ’s advertising 
Ma = The market share of Firm A 
Mb = The market share of Firm B
In the absence of price competition, an assumption which is not too unrealistic in many 
oligopolistic situations, we have:
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Ma = 0 (Va , Vb) 
m b = V (VA, VB) 
VA = f(V B)
and, VB = g (Va)
( 1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Equations (1) and (2) show that the market share of each firm is a function of the firm’s 
own advertising as well as its competitor’s advertising with the following properties:
3Ma  _ n. 92M a _ n. 3Mb _ n . ^ M b  , n . 9M a . n. 5Mb , n 
> ° ’ dVA? ’ ()Vb s v ?  < ° ’ m < ° ’ SvX
These properties suggest that market share is positively related to the firm's own 
advertising with diminishing returns and negatively related to the competitor’s advertising.
Equations (3) and (4) represent advertising reaction functions where the firm’s own 
advertising depends on the com petitor’s advertising in the frame of an oligopolistic 
interdependence.
If the firm’s objective is to maintain its market share and use advertising as a tool to 
achieve this objective, we have:
£ a / o a  =  C -  ( 5 )
Equation (5) suggests that in the absence of price competition a firm will reach 
optimality with respect to its advertising expenditure when the ratio of its market-share elasticity 
with respect to its own advertising [s a = 0 M a  /  3Va ) (Va /  M a )] to its market share 
elasticity with respect to competitors’ advertising [ca  = (3Ma /  3Vb) (Vb / M a)] and equals 
the advertising reaction elasticity [£a  = ( dVs /  dVO (Va /  Vb)].
Also, if advertising was purely defensive we would expect an immediate and equal 
reaction i.e.
(6)
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and this will give:
g a /g b  = 0A/0B (7)
where 0a ( = Va /  Sa ) and 0b (= Vb /  Sb) are the advertising sales ratios of firms A and B 
respectively.
Equation (7) suggests that if advertising was used as a pure defensive mechanism the 
sales ratios of any two firms would be proportional to their market share elasticity with respect 
to their own advertising.
Movements in market shares of individual firms depend on many variables in addition 
to price and advertising competition. However, advertising is regarded as the major influence 
on market shares in mainly differential product markets characterised by non-price competition. 
But the exact relationship between advertising and market shares has not been fully understood 
in existing literature. A Unear (or linearly transformed) relationship between the two variables 
implies no decreasing marginal returns to advertising. Its optimisation, therefore, would 
suggest infinite advertising followed by an infinite expansion in market share. This does not 
seem to confirm to the practical situation. Many oligopolistic industries are characterised by the 
existence of a high proportion of “attached” or “loyal” customers. This customers “loyalty” has 
serious implications for the advertising market-share relationship. First it suggests the 
existence of a saturation point. There is an upper limit to the percentage of market share a 
particular firm would be able to achieve through intensive advertising even if its competitors did 
not follow suit. Secondly, a firm is not likely to loose all or most of its market share simply 
because it does not retaliate immediately and equally. There will always be a number of 
“attached customers” who would not be easily persuaded to shift to other brands. This seems to 
be the case in most service industries. Banking is a good example. Many of the customers 
have been dealing with the same bank for generations. Also there seems to be an advantage not 
to change banks frequently since most, if not all, banks would seem to give preferential 
treatment (in granting various of loans and other services) to customers who held accounts with 
them for a minimum period of time. The following mathematical model has been developed to
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capture the above-mentioned characteristics of advertising competition in differential product 
markets with non-price competition.
Mi = A + F exp - ( a  / Vi + |3 Vj) 
A, F, a , p > 0 (8)
where: Mi =
Vi =
Vj =
A =
F =
market share of the ith firm, 
advertising outlays of the i|h firm, 
rival advertising in period t.
percentage of total industry’s customers (or sales) loyal to the ith firm, 
percentage of total industry’s customer (or sales) not attatched to any 
firm.
The above model gives:
^  = F ( a / V ? ) e x p  - ( a / V i  + (3Vj) > 0 (9)
9Mi
av; = - p F exp - (a  / Vj + p Vj) < 0 ( 10)
lim  Mj 
Vi—»°o Vj = 0 = A + F ( 11)
lim  Mj 
Vi-^0 Vj > 0 = A ( 12)
lim  Mj
Vj-»oo V j=  0 = A (13)
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The relationship expressed by equations (9) through (13) have the properties of the log 
normal distribution [1]. These relationships clearly suggest decreasing marginal returns to 
expenditure on advertising. A firm would only be able to attract a maximum  number of 
customers i.e. the “floating customers”, even if it expands its advertising budget by extremely 
large amounts and its competitors did not follow suit. Also, a firm would not lose all its 
customers if it did not respond at all to rival advertising or if its competitors embark on massive 
advertising campaigns.
Empirical evidence on the role of advertising in oligopolistic markets was obtained by 
testing two econometric models:
/ —
Model 1: In Mjt = ao + ai In Vjt + a2 In Vjt + a3 In Pt + a* In Mjt-i + uit (14)
/
Model 2: Mit = Oq + a i  exp - ( 0C2 /  Vi + 0C3 V p + U2t (15)
Both models explore the existing relation between the share of the market and the share 
in marketing pressure. They give market share as a function of the firm’s advertising (Vi) and
r
competitive advertising of all other rivals (Vj ). Market share in Model 1 is also assumed to
depend on relative prices (P), while Model 2 assumes non-price competition. Model 1 is 
similar to the models developed by Kotler [16], Lambin [17], Urban [30] and Weiss [32]. The 
use of double-logs gives direct estimates of market share elasticities with respect to firm’s 
advertising (ai), rival advertising (a2) and relative prices (a3). The introduction of the variable 
Mit-i, gives the model a dynamic character. Model 2, is a non-linear relationship representing 
equation (8) which was developed in the light of the above theoretical discussion.
Model (1) was estimated using the least-squares method of estimation. The estimation 
procedure was carried out in three stages. In the first stage, parameters of the model were 
estimated consistently by Liviatan’s instrumental variable approach. In the second stage, 
results of the first stage were employed in order to produce consistent estimates of the residuals 
by ordinary least squares. Finally using the results of the preceding stage, ordinary least 
squares was again applied to the transformed regression model to yield estimates of the 
parameter. The resulting estimates are consistent and asymptotically efficient.
7
The parameter estimates of Model (2) are maximum likelihood estimates obtained by the 
non-linear least squares, implying the usual assumptions about an additive error term.
In order to estimate the advertising reaction elasticities, we also tested the following 
econometric model:
M odel3: Vjt = b0 + bi Vit + b2 Vjt. i + e t (16)
This reduced form is based on the following partial adjustment model:
V* = Po + Pl Vit + ut
(Vjt - Vjt.!) = 6(Vj; - Vjt-i) + € t , 0 < 5 < 1.
A substitution yields
Vjt = 5p0 + 5(3 i Vu + (1 - 5) Vjt-i + (Ut + 5e t) 
which is the same as (16) above.
Model 3 was estimated using the same techniques as used for Model (1).
SECTIO N  2
DATA AND R EG R ESSIO N  RESULTS
Models 1 and 2 were tested using data related to four Australian banks. Data on 
advertising were provided by Gamsey Pty Ltd, Marketing and Advertising Consultants, 
Sydney. Data on interest rates, loans and bank revenues were supplied by individual banks. 
The most recent figures were checked for accuracy by comparing them with those published in 
the special issues of the Australian Business Review Weekly, Oct. 1988, 1989 and 1990. The 
most basic characteristics of these banks are shown in Table 1. These banks went through 
extensive deregulation arrangements in the early 1980’s. Interest rate controls on deposit rates
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were removed in December 1980 and regulations on the terms of fixed deposits and certificates 
of deposits were relaxed in August 1981, March 1982, and abolished in August 1984. Interest 
rate regulations on loans were relaxed in April 1985 and April 1986. Portfolio restrictions were 
relaxed sequentially in June 1982 (the end of quantitative lending guidelines), August 1982 (to 
savings banks), and relaxation of asset compositions in May 1985, April 1987 (to savings 
banks) and September 1988 [9]. Another important structural change in the Australian banking 
industry was the entry of foreign banks in 1985 in reply to the Treasurer’s invitation [3]. It 
was predicted that these banks would secure 20% of the Australian banking market within five 
years of their entry [12]. As a result of deregulation banks have had to achieve substantial 
improvements in operating costs and in their marketing behaviour to maintain adequate 
profitability. They paid attention to both price and non-price attributes of their products. The 
new entrants to the market have shown the ability to win market share and have affected 
competition in product innovation, pricing access and delivery. The emphasis on non-price 
competition manifests itself in the incentives of banks to differentiate themselves and their 
products. There has been a dramatic increase in marketing research and a tendency to rely more 
on competitive advertising in expanding market shares and to use advertising as a defensive 
mechanism to maintain existing market shares of some banks.
We labelled our sample, Bank A, B, C and D in order not to disclose confidential 
information about their operations. Banks A and B are established financial institutions with 
estimated total assets of more than 36 billion US dollars each. Bank C’s assets are valued at 
approximately 9 billion US dollars. Bank D is the smallest, in the sample, with estimated 
assets of approximately 4 billion US dollars. Table 1 reveals that there is a direct relationship 
between market shares and the size of assets. Profitability of the two large banks (as a 
percentage of their total revenue) is higher than that of the smaller banks. However Bank D, 
the smallest in the sample, seems to perform much better than Bank C. Also, this bank has the 
highest percentage of total revenue to total assets amongst all sample banks.
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Table 1 Some Basic Economic Indicators of Sample Banks (1990)
Economic Indicators Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D
Market Share (%) 13.2 12.4 2.6 1.8
Percentage of net profit 
to total revenue 6.4 4.1 2.4 3.6
Percentage of net profit 
to total assets 0.78 0.49 0.28 0.49
Percentage of total revenue 
on total assets 12.1 12.0 11.8 13.6
Average return on funds (%) 
(1987 - 1990) 12.0 9.0 5.1 7.9
Average return on revenue (%) 
(1987 - 1990) 6.3 4.1 2.5 3.7
Gearing 6.4 5.5 5.7 6.3
Average percent growth in 
revenue (1987 - 1990) 19.3 10.1 10.5 31.4
Average percent growth in 
profit (1987 - 1990) 35.0 2.8 17.8 24.7
The two large banks also seem to have a higher return on funds and revenue than the 
two smaller banks. But here again, Bank C ’s performance is inferior to that of Bank D. In 
terms of growth, the smallest bank scored the highest rate of growth in revenue and the second 
highest in profit during the three years 1987-1990. Bank B, the second largest in terms of 
assets and market share, scored the lowest rates of growth in these variables during the 
mentioned period. Gearing, which is defined as shareholder’s funds as a percentage of total 
assets, does not seem to differ much between larger and smaller banks included in the sample.
The three econometric models specified above were tested on annual data for the period 
1975-1989. The regression results are given in Tables 2, 3 and 4 respectively. It is clear that 
all variables carry the correct sign. The values of R2 suggest a good fit in each case and the
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values of D.W. or Durbin’s h (in case of the lagged models) do not suggest the presence of any 
serious problems of serial correlation.
The t values (given in parenthesis under each coefficient) for the price variables (which 
are represented by relative interest rates (%)) were not statistically significant in most cases. 
This suggests that during the period of study, most of it was subject to financial regulations, 
non-price competition was a main feature of Australian banks. It seems, therefore that 
advertising has succeeded, in this industry, to minimise direct comparison of interest rates.
The regression results suggest that bank’s own advertising and competitive advertising 
are both significant determinants of the competitive position of banks as given by their market 
shares. This is evident from the statistical significance of the coefficients of V; and Vj in both 
Models (1) and (2). On the whole one observes that Model (2) gives superior results to Model 
(1) as indicated by the values of R2. Also, the error variance S2 = Z[X - E(X)]2 where E(X) 
is the expected value of X obtained from each regression was much smaller for Model (2) than 
for model (1). This would seem to support the hypothesis that the markets share-advertising 
relationship is non-linear with a saturation point.
Table 2 Regression Results of Model (1)
The Model: In Mjt = ^  + ai In Vjt + a2 In Vj't + a3 In Pt + a4 In Mit.] + u it
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Estimated Coefficients Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D
A
&o .435
(1.429)
.471
(2.022)
.523
(3.017)
.560
(2.954)
A
ai .036
(2.816)
.038
(2.798)
.044
(2.794)
.045
(2.840)
A
a 2 -.034
(-2.949)
-.037
(-2.740)
-.038
(-2.925)
-.036
(-2.789)
A
a3 -1.144
(-1.835)
-1.210
(-1.777)
-1.319
(-1.804)
-1.346
(-1.980)
A
a4 .684
(2.976)
.673
(2.888)
.809
(2.871)
.792
(2.885)
R2 .874 .819 .822 .867
F 19.6 17.7 23.4 21.5
Durbin’s “h” .310 .244 .365 .272
The results of Models (2) and (3) were used to estimate marginal rates of change of 
market shares with respect to bank’s advertising (8m i/ 9Vi) and competitors’ advertising 
0 m i / 3Vj), market share elasticities and advertising reaction elasticities. These estimates are 
given in Table 5. Also given in this table are actual advertising revenue ratios of the four 
banks, where bank’s revenue is taken as a proxy variable for its sales.
The data in Table 5 would seem to suggest that:
(1) Larger banks use advertising as a defensive mechanism to protect their market shares.
This is evident from:
(i) The approximate equivalence of the ratios of market share elasticities with 
respect to bank’s advertising to the estimates of the advertising revenue ratios. 
It can easily be seen that for bank’s A and B:
€ a / 6 B  -  0a /  0B-
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Table 3 Regression Results of Model (2)
The Model: Mjt = Oq + a i  exp - {<22/ Vi + 0C3Vj} + U2t
Estimated Coefficients Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D
A
Oo .069 .055 .012 .008
(3.043) (2.906) (3.004) (2.985)
A
(XI .461 .456 .463 .459
(2.892 (2.915) (3.017) (3.221)
A
<*2 .472 .637 .509 .523
(3.516) (3.140) (2.946) (3.119)
A
«3 .411 .584 .612 .645
(3.220) (3.075) (2.989) (2.903)
R2 .934 .912 .905 .906
F 44.4 40.8 36.7 37.3
D.W. 1.849 2.003 1.946 2.141
Table 4 Regression Results of Model (3)
The Model: Vjt = b0 + bi Vjt + b2 Vjt_i + et
Estimated Coefficients Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D
A
b0 .723 .681 .708 .699
(1.320) (1.971) (2.685) 2.738)
A
bi .521 .498 .204 .153
(3.107) (3.500) (3.603) (3.000)
A
b2 .740 .671 .695 .623
(3.025) (3.342) (3.526) (3.104)
R2 .907 .915 .922 .906
F 29.5 34.4 36.8 28.2
Durbin’s “h” -.142 .365 .244 -.150
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Table 5 Market Shares’ Response to Advertising
Variables Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D
d m j .113 .120 .154 .148
Smj / 5Vj -.116 -.119 -.119 -.103
Market share elasticity with 
respect to bank’s advertising
(e ) .036 .046 .055 .067
Market share elasticity with 
respect to competitors’
advertising (a) -.034 -.044 -.042 -.045
Advertising reaction 
elasticity (Q 1.053 1.049 1.969 2.003
Advertising revenue ratios (0) .0014 .0018 .0085 .0108
(ii) The approximate equivalence of the ratios of market share elasticities with 
respect to banks and competitors’ advertising to the value of advertising reaction 
elasticity i.e.,
- S i /  CTi = Cij ; i . j  = A, B ( i * j )
(iii) The estimates of the marginal rates of change of market share with respect to 
bank’s advertising (3mj /  9Vj) and competitor’s advertising (3mj /  3Vj) are very 
close. This suggests that a substantial part of advertising is self-cancelling.
(2) The data in Table 5, on the other hand, suggest that the advertising revenue ratios of 
banks C and D are much greater than the ratios of their market share elasticities with 
respect to bank’s advertising or:
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6 c / 6 n c  > € c / e nC 
0 D/ 0n D>  e o / e nD
where nC refers to a bank other than C, and nD refers to a bank other than D.
Also, for banks C and D, the values of advertising reaction elasticity are much greater 
than the ratios of their market share elasticities with respect to bank’s and competitors’ 
advertising
Cij > - e i/0 i; i, j = C, D ( i * j )
These results would seem to suggest that banks C and D advertise heavily. This 
excessiveness may suggest use of advertising as an offensive mechanism and not as a defensive 
tool.
SECTION 3
INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN MARKET SHARES AND ADVERTISING
There is a general agreement that not only market shares are influenced by advertising, 
but advertising is also influenced by market shares. Therefore, it could be argued that the 
analysis of the above section may be subject to a simultaneous bias. To overcome this 
problem, we tested a simultaneous equation model using the following structural equations:
Mu = ocq + a i  exp - ( 0C2 /  Vu + CC3V J  + 04 Pt + a s  Mu-i + e u  
Vit = Po + Pi V 't + p2 Vjt-i + exp ( -  p3 /  Mit) + e2t 
V-t = Yo + Yl Vit + Y2 Vjt.j + exp [ - 73 /  (1 - Mit)] + e3t
where all variables are defined as before.
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The above system has three endogenous variables: Mjt, Vit and Vjt and five 
predetermined variables: Pt, Mjt_i, (1 - Mjt), Vit-i, Vjt-i.
The first equation is similar to Model 2 except that market share is assumed to depend 
also on relative prices (i.e. relative interest rates).
The non-linearity assumption is maintained to exhibit decreasing marginal returns to 
advertising expenditures and highlight the importance of consumers’ loyalty.
The second and third equations in the system specify the advertising decision rule in 
terms of three factors usually deemed to influence the level of advertising appropriations i.e. 
market shares, firm’s and rival advertising. Here again, we departed from existing literature by 
assuming a non-linear relationship between market share and advertising. This departure is 
based on two grounds. Established firms can use product differentiation (through advertising) 
as barriers to entry only to a limited degree. New entrants once passed the initial “break-in” 
period would be able to compete on equal terms with the old established firms. Secondly, 
firms do take account of possible rival responses in advertising. The negative effect of rivals’ 
advertising on their demand will cause them to advertise less. Thus firms would try to avoid 
advertising-intensity wars as much as they would try to avoid price-cutting wars.
The introduction of lagged dependent variables in each equation gives it a dynamic 
character.
Applying the rank and order conditions of identification, we find that all equations are 
over- identified. The limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) is therefore, appropriate 
for estimating the parameters of the three equations. The regression results are given in table 6.
The regression results of the simultaneous-equations system would seem to support 
those of the single-equation models. The coefficients of the advertising variable in each 
equation were statistically significant and carry the correct sign. This indicates that advertising 
plays an important role in this market and that each firm tends to adjust its advertising according 
to the past appropriations of its rivals. Also, the regression results suggest that both firm’s and 
rival advertising exert a significant influence on the competitive position of firms as given by 
their market share.
Table 6 Regression Results of Simultaneous Equation Models
BANK A
Mit = .066 + 
(3.005)
- ,034Pt + 
(- 1.989)
.473 exp - (.325 /  Vit + .468Vjt) 
(3.779) (3.412) (3.537) 
.420Mit_i 
(3.294)
R2 = .923; F = 67.8; h = - .225
vit = -.338 + 
(-.796)
.802Vjt + exp (-.482 /  Mit) + .431Vit.i 
(3.111) (-2.900) (3.251)
R2 = .904; F = 31.2; h = .445
/
v j> = .327 + 
(1.774)
1.218Vit +exp [ - .343 /  (1 - Mit)] + .220vjt 
(2.999) (-3.355) (3.465)
R2 = .914; F = 37.1; h = .645
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Table 6 Regression Results of Simultaneous Equation Models (cont.)
BANK B
Mit = .050 + .469 exp - (.428 / Vit + .537Vjt)
(2.965) (3.188) (3.241) (3.002)
- .036rt + .362Mit.i
(- 2.006) (3.499)
R2 = .921; F = 49.3; h = 1.005
vit = -.213 + ,913Vjt + exp (-.485 /  Mit) + •431Vit.i
(-1.611) (3.008) (-2.879) (3.267)
R2 = .898; F = 28.9; h = - .124
f
VJt = .164 + .411 Vit + exp [ - . 3 1 7 / ( I - M it)] + .329Vjt
(.925) (3446) (3.047) (3.568)
R2 = .948; F = 48.6; h = .107
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Table 6 Regression Results o f Simultaneous Equation M odels (cont.)
BANK C
Mit = .008 + .461 exp - (.489 /  Vit + ,426Vjt)
(3.011) (3.205) (3.398) (3.267)
- .040rt + .522Mit_i
(- 1.904) (2.963)
R2 = .909; F = 31.1;' h = - .048
v it = -.027 + .826Vjt +exp (-.249 /  Mu) + .416Vit_i
(-1.135) (3.1421) (-2.851) (3.614)
R2 = .928; F 41.1; h = .446
/
vi. = .088 + .843Vit +exp [ - . 1 3 2 / ( 1 - Mit)] + -328Vjt
(1.073) (3.162) (-3.600) (3.941)
R2 = .931; F = 42.6; h = .597
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Table 6 R egression R esults of S im ultaneous E quation  M odels (cont.)
BANK D
Mit = .066 + .473 exp - (.555 /  Vit + .500Vjt)
(2.868) (2.993) (3.261) (2.952)
- ,041rt + .549Mit.i
(- 1.863) (3.244)
R2 = .918; F = 36.3; h = - .303
v it = -.077 + .868 Vjt -i-exp (-.262 / Mit) + .463Vit-i
(.691) (3.100) (-2.905) (3.488)
R2 = .926; F = 44.8; h = .674
v J t = .122 + .324Vit + exp [ - .121 /  (1 Mit)] + -382Vjt
(-1.015) (3.071) (-3.408) (2.956)
R2 = .935; F = 39.2; h = 1.010
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The results of the simultaneous-equations model support the hypothesis that advertising 
and market shares are non-linearly related. This suggests decreasing marginal returns to 
expenditure on advertising in the banking industry. It also highlights the significance of 
“consumer loyalty” in analysis of the competitive behaviour of firms in certain markets. 
Moreover the coefficients representing the price variable were not statistically significant at the 5 
percent level of significance in any of the firms studied. This suggests that the banking 
industry is characterized by non-price competition and indicates that advertising competition 
succeeded to minimise direct comparison of interest rates. This is not surprising given that 
interest rates on similar types of loans for equal periods do not seem to differ very significantly 
between banks.
The simultaneous regression results were used to test if the single-equation models’ 
conclusions regarding the role of advertising in this industry still hold.
The regression results of Table 6 were used to estimate the market share elasticities of 
bank’s advertising ^mvj = [( 3mj /  8 s j ) ( sj /  mi)]. These were: 0.038, 0.043, 0.052, 0.069 
for banks A, B C and D respectively. Also estimated is the market share elasticity with respect 
to rival advertising ^mvj = [( 9mj /  3v j ) /  ( vj /  m j )]. The results w ere -0.034,-0.041,-0.040 
and -0.047 for the banks A, B, C and D respectively. Finally, the results were used in 
estimating the reaction advertising elasticity ^vj = [( 8vi /  5s j ) /  ( sj /  v j )]. These were 1.064, 
1.057,1.896 and 1.993. Comparing the values of these elasticities, we notice that for banks A 
and B, the values of the advertising reaction elasticity are very close to the ratios of their 
market-share elasticities with respect to their own and rival advertising. This suggests that 
advertising of those two (large) banks plays a “market defensive” role. As for banks C and D, 
the values of the advertising reaction elasticity are much greater than the ratios of their market- 
share elasticity with respect to rival and bank advertising. These results support the findings of 
the single-equation models and suggest that the smaller banks advertise heavily in trying to 
expand their market shares.
21
CO NCLUSIO NS
The main results of this paper may be summarised in the following:
(1) It is possible to investigate the role played by advertising and whether it is used as an 
offensive or defensive mechanism (in expanding or protecting market shares) through 
comparisons between values of elasticities with respect to a firm ’s own advertising, 
competitors’ advertising and reaction advertising. This paper outlines a number of 
criteria which show how these comparisons can be used in evaluating this role.
(2) A saturation point seems to exist in the relationship between market share and 
advertising expenditure. This suggest that the variables are non-linearly related and 
their relationship may follow the properties of the log-normal distribution.
(3) The closeness of the estimates of the marginal rates of change of market shares with 
respect to firm ’s advertising and rivals’ advertising suggest a substantial part of 
advertising is “self-cancelling”.
(4) The statistical evidence suggest that the larger banks in Australia use their advertising 
expenditure in protecting their market position while the smaller banks advertise heavily 
in trying to expand their market shares and consolidate their positions.
(5) Advertising in the Australian banking industry, particularly during periods of financial 
regulations, has succeeded to minimise direct comparison of interest rates. This non­
price competition has become a major feature of this industry.
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